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Network Neutrality after Comcast:  Toward a Case-by-Case Approach to 
Reasonable Network Management 
by 
Christopher S. Yoo 
Introduction 
 Over the past few years, network neutrality has emerged as perhaps the most contentious 
issue in communications policy.  The issue has been the focus of numerous congressional 
hearings1 and played a pivotal role during the consideration of comprehensive reform legislation 
in 2006.2  Network neutrality also drew substantial attention from the Federal Trade 
Commission, which conducted two days of hearings and authored a lengthy report on the 
subject.3  Most importantly, it has been a recurrent issue before the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC), having influenced the clearance of numerous mergers4 and prompted a 
recent notice of inquiry.5  Network neutrality even emerged as a point of contention during the 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., The Internet Freedom Preservation Act of 2008:  Hearing on H.R. 5353 Before the Subcommittee 
on Telecommunications and the Internet, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 110th Cong. (May 6, 2008); 
Net Neutrality and Free Speech on the Internet:  Hearing Before the Task Force on Competition Policy and 
Antitrust Laws, House Committee on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (March 11, 2008); Communications Reform Bill 
Hearing II:  Hearing on S. 286 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transportation, 109th Cong. (2006); 
Network Neutrality: Competition, Innovation, and Nondiscriminatory Access: Hearing Before the Telecom and 
Antitrust Task Force of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 4 (2006); Net Neutrality: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transportation, 109th Cong. (2006). 
2 See Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847, 1859-60 
(2006).  
3 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, STAFF REPORT ON BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION POLICY (June 
2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/broadband/v070000report.pdf. 
4 See Daniel F. Spulber and Christopher S. Yoo, Mandating Access to Telecom and the Internet: The Hidden 
Side of Trinko, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1822, 1873-74 (2007) (discussing the role network neutrality played in the 
SBC-AT&T, Verizon-MCI, Adelphia-Time Warner, and AT&T-BellSouth mergers); Sprint Nextel Corp. and 
Clearwire Corp., Applications for Consent to Transfer Control of Licenses, Leases, and Authorizations, FCC 08-
259, at 41 ¶ 99 (Nov. 7, 2008), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-08-259A1.pdf; 
Applications of Cellco Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless and Atlantis Holdings LLC for Consent to Transfer 
Control of Licenses, Authorizations, and Spectrum  Manager and De Facto Transfer Leasing Arrangements, 
Memorandum Opinion and Order and Declaratory Ruling, FCC 08-258, at 88 ¶ 191 (Nov. 10, 2008), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-08-258A1.pdf. 
5 Broadband Industry Practices, Notice of Inquiry, 22 F.C.C.R. 7894 (2007). 
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presidential campaign.6  Given Barack Obama’s support for network neutrality both as a U.S. 
Senator and as a presidential candidate,7 pressure for the adoption of network neutrality 
regulation will likely intensify in the near future.   
 I have long argued for a middle course in network neutrality.  Rather than regulating 
network management practices through categorical, ex ante restrictions, I have advocated an ex 
post, case-by-case approach that imposes liability when and only when a particular practice is 
shown to give rise to harm competition.8  Such a case-by-case approach would strike a balance 
between two opposing considerations.  On the one hand, economic theories exist that 
demonstrate circumstances under which vertical integration and exclusivity arrangements can 
harm consumers.  On the other hand, the scholarly consensus recognizes that those 
circumstances are quite limited and that vertical integration and exclusivity arrangements often 
benefit consumers.  A case-by-case approach offers the promise of allowing regulatory 
authorities to redress the potential anticompetitive harms without preventing the realization of 
the potential benefits. 
 The FCC’s recent order sanctioning Comcast for its network management practices 
embraced the type of ex post, case-by-case approach described above.9  That said, the ultimate 
impact of the order remains unclear.  As an initial matter, Comcast is currently challenging the 
                                                 
6 See Lee Gomes, Debugging Obama-McCain, FORBES, Oct. 13, 2008, at 72. 
7 See Obama ’08, Barack Obama:  Connecting and Empowering All Americans, Through Technology and 
Innovation, http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/issues/technology/Fact_Sheet_Innovation_and_Technology.pdf; 
Barack Obama, Net Neutrality (June 8, 2006), http://obama.senate.gov/podcast/060608-network_neutral/. 
8 See Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating Broadband Network Neutrality Help or Hurt Competition?:  A 
Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 23, 43-46, 58-59 (2004) [hereinafter 
Yoo, Comment on End-to-End]; Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 7-8, 24, 
75-76 (2005) [hereinafter Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality]; Yoo, supra note 2, at 1854-55, 1900, 1908; Christopher 
S. Yoo, Network Neutrality, Consumers, and Innovation, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179, 186-87, 212, 227, 238, 246-
47, 257, 261 [hereinafter Yoo, Consumers, and Innovation]. 
9 Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation for Secretly 
Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 F.C.C.R. 13028 ¶¶ 28-40 (2008). 
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legality of that order in the courts.  Congress is poised to consider network neutrality legislation 
that would change the regulatory landscape considerably if Comcast should prevail in its 
challenge.  Even if the Comcast order is upheld and serves as the foundation for a regime of 
network neutrality, by its nature the FCC’s decision was limited to the particular fact pattern that 
was before the agency, which inevitably left the vast majority of the substantive content of the 
resulting case-by-case approach to future cases.  Thus, the precise manner in which network 
neutrality regulation will be implemented remains an open question. 
 In this chapter, I discuss the type of considerations that a case-by-case approach should 
take into account.  In particular, I address claims that network neutrality is needed to preserve 
innovation, protect consumers, and promote competition on the Internet, showing that on closer 
inspection the issues are not as clear as network neutrality proponents suggest.  On the contrary, 
the ambiguousness of network neutrality’s policy implications make it ideally suited to a case-
by-case approach instead of ex ante prohibitions.  Moreover, the potential benefits from 
deviating from network neutrality provide important considerations that a well designed case-by-
case approach should take into account. 
Network Neutrality and Innovation 
 When the Internet first arose, it was designed around a protocol known as TCP/IP.  One 
of TCP/IP’s distinguishing features is that it routes traffic without any awareness of the source of 
the traffic or the application with which it is associated.10  Since those early days, network 
providers have begun to experiment with different network architectures.  Some are prioritizing 
traffic associated with certain applications over other traffic.  Others are charging higher prices 
to content and application providers who use higher bandwidth services. 
                                                 
10 TCP/IP stands for transmission control protocol/Internet protocol. 
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 According to network neutrality proponents, these changes threaten innovation in Internet 
content and applications in two ways.  First, content and application providers’ success depends 
in no small part on the number of customers they can reach.  Allowing network providers to 
exercise greater control over the traffic flowing through their networks would enable those 
network providers to restrict the number of end users that any particular content or application 
provider could reach either by blocking them entirely or by charging content and application 
providers more in order to reach them.11 
 Second, TCP/IP fosters a particular type of innovation.  Network neutrality proponents 
argue that one key to the Internet revolution is the commitment to an architecture in which the 
pipes through which the data flows are as simple and general as possible and in which all of the 
intelligence is concentrated in the computers operating at the edge of the network.  This 
architecture frees content and application providers from the need to obtain permission from 
network providers before deploying their innovations.  In other words, TCP/IP promotes 
innovation by decoupling content and application providers from the network through which that 
content and those application travel.  Any deviation that creates a tighter integration between the 
network and the content/applications that the network is carrying would chill innovation by 
raising the danger that part of the value of any innovations might be captured by the network 
provider.12 
 Although there is certainly considerable truth to both of these claims, upon closer 
inspection, we find that in many cases deviations from network neutrality would actually prove 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the 
Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 932 (2001) (“Because it does not discriminate in favor of 
certain s uses of the network and against others, the Internet has provided a competitive environment in which 
innovators know that their inventions will be used if useful.”).   
12 See, e.g., id. at 930-33, 939-46; LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 34-37, 40-41, 162 (2002); Tim 
Wu, The Broadband Debate, A User’s Guide, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 69, 73-74 (2004). 
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more effective in promoting innovation.  The possibility that innovation might benefit from 
allowing network providers to experiment with different architectures not only suggests that ex 
ante network neutrality restrictions would probably be a policy mistake; it also provides an 
important consideration that any case-by-case approach must take into account. 
 Changes in the Optimal Level of Standardization 
 Consider first the claim that standardization and interoperability facilitate innovation by 
guaranteeing that content and application providers will be able to reach the broadest possible 
range of potential customers.13  There is no question that standardization provides many benefits.  
Being able to offer products that are interoperable with as many other products as possible 
lowers the risks of innovation.  Standardization also benefits consumers by maximizing price 
competition among those products.   
 Despite these benefits, not all products are standardized, nor should they be.  Economic 
theorists have long recognized that one of the inevitable costs of standardization is the loss of 
product variety that must be traded off against the benefits of standardization.  Such losses are 
trivial if customer preferences are homogeneous and in effect everyone wants the same thing.  In 
those cases, the optimal solution is to standardize the network in accordance with what 
consumers desire most.  A different situation obtains when end users’ preferences vary widely.  
As customer preferences become increasingly heterogeneous, eventually the optimal solution is 
to establish multiple standards, with each tailored toward a different subsegment of end users. 
 The shifts in the population of end users have changed in ways that make moves toward a 
more diverse, nonstandardized Internet more likely.  What began as a medium through which a 
                                                 
13 For a more technical discussion of the ideas that follow, see Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 8, 
at 33-37; Yoo, Consumers, and Innovation, supra note 8, at 212-14, 243-45; Yoo, Comment on End-to-End, supra 
note 8, at 56-59. 
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small number of academics sent e-mail and shared files has evolved into a mass market 
phenomenon.  A rapidly growing number of end users are using the network in an ever 
increasing variety of ways.   
 Viewed from this perspective, the deployment of protocols optimized to perform different 
tasks may represent nothing more than the response of an industry attempting to meet consumer 
demand.  As what consumers want becomes increasingly varied, it is natural and inevitable that 
the network will evolve to meet those demands.  In other words, the shift away from the one-
size-fits all Internet may actually represent nothing more than the natural byproduct of network 
providers’ attempts to satisfy what consumers want. 
 I advance this argument without taking anything away from the benefits that 
standardization and interoperability can provide.  In fact, a network firm faces powerful 
incentives to adhere to the existing standard.  Moreover, the emergence of sufficient competition 
among last-mile providers should be sufficient to protect against anticompetitive outcomes 
without any need for governmental intervention. 
 Suppose, for example, that there are three network providers that all interconnect through 
the same protocol.  How should policymakers respond should one of those providers wish to 
deviate from that protocol in a way that renders it noninteroperable with the other providers?  
Three outcomes are possible.  First, the new standard may provide significant benefits to all 
consumers, in which case the provider that changed standards will increase its customer base 
until the other network providers follow suit.  If so, the optimal result emerges without 
government intervention, and the last thing that policymakers should do is step in to compel 
adherence to the old standard.  Second, the new standard may hold no appeal for consumers, in 
which case the network provider that changed standards will hemorrhage customers to its 
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competitors until it returns to the fold.  Once again, the optimal solution will occur without the 
need for governmental intervention to mandate the old standard.  Third, the new standard may 
appeal to some consumers, but not to others.  If there are a sufficient number of customers that 
prefer the new standard, the result may well be that the provider that shifted to the new standard 
will continue to employ it, while the other providers continue to adhere to the old standard.  In 
this case, nonstandardization yields benefits, and it would be a mistake for policymakers to 
intervene to mandate adherence to the old standard.   
 This simple example illustrates the economic insight that any firm seeking to differentiate 
its services does so in the face of powerful incentives to remain standardized and will only do so 
if it believes that the new standard will provide sufficient benefits to offset the reduction in the 
value of the network caused by the reduction in the number of other end users that its customers 
could reach through its network.  In fact, this effect is so strong that the traditional concern in the 
economic literature is that network firms will be too unwilling to deviate from the existing 
standard and will adhere to established technologies even after they have become obsolete.14  
Even these concerns are dissipated if there is sufficient competition among network providers.  
Although the last-mile broadband market has not to date been highly competitive, in the last 
three years mobile wireless broadband networks have emerged as an increasingly viable 
broadband alternative.  Furthermore, as I discuss in greater detail below, additional increases in 
competition among last-mile broadband depends in no small part on network providers’ ability to 
prioritize traffic on the basis of applications and content. 
                                                 
14 See Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 8, at 73.  For a review of the literature on tipping and 
lock-in in the context of broadband, see Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New 
Economy, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 278-82 (2002).  
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 Note also that this hypothetical is framed as a polar choice between complete 
interoperability and completely noninteroperability.  As network neutrality proponents 
acknowledge, complete noninteroperability is rarely a problem.  Consumers can easily detect any 
attempt to completely block access to particular content and applications and are likely to force 
network providers to desist from any such practice.   
 The real issue lies in the spectrum of partial interoperability lying between these two 
extremes.  In this space, prioritizing one set of applications does not preclude subscribers from 
running other applications.  Instead, it represents a form of partial interoperability, in which all 
applications run on all networks, but some applications run better on some networks than others.  
One aspect of the economic literature on standardization that has been largely overlooked shows 
that the presence of perfect, low cost adapters that can serve as a gateway between two 
technologies essentially eliminates any anticompetitive concerns associated with 
nonstandardization.15  When adapters are imperfect, the welfare implications are ambiguous.16 
 Circumstances thus exist where permitting network providers to deviate from the current 
network architecture may actually enhance rather than inhibit innovation on the Internet.  
Whether that is the case depends largely on the underlying heterogeneity of demand.  And the 
presence of adapters might in some (but not all) cases ameliorate any welfare losses caused by 
nonstandardization.  The complexity and the fact-intensiveness of the analysis offers strong 
support for a case-by-case approach that carefully examines each set of circumstances before 
intervening in order to make sure that the preconditions for harming innovation are met.  The 
                                                 
15 See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. 
REV. 424, 439 (1985) (“[I]f the costs of adapting are negligible, and there are no other entry barriers, the market will 
be perfectly competitive.”). 
16 See Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Converters, Compatibility, and the Control of Interfaces, 40 J. INDUS. 
ECON. 9, 32 (1992) (“[C]onverters might seem to promise the benefits of compatibility without the loss of variety 
due to standardization  Indeed, when converters are costless and perfect, this is true; but that is rare.  In general, the 
welfare impact of the availability of converters is ambiguous.”). 
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failure to undertake such nuanced assessments creates the real danger that mandating network 
neutrality may actually harm the innovation that network neutrality proponents seek to promote. 
 Changes in the Optimal Level of Integration Between Networks and Applications 
 As noted earlier, network neutrality proponents also contend that innovation is best 
promoted when there is minimal integration between the traffic riding on the network and the 
network itself.  The claim is that decoupling content and applications from the network frees 
content and application providers to pursue whatever innovation they would like without having 
to seek permission from the network owner.  The problem with this argument is that no protocol 
is optimized for every application.  Thus the commitment to any particular architecture 
inevitably favors certain types of innovation over others, which suggests that the term “network 
neutrality” represents something of a misnomer. 
 The way that the current network architecture is skewing innovation can most easily be 
understood by focusing on two principles around which the current network is designed.17  First, 
TCP/IP routes traffic on a “best efforts” basis, that is, it routes traffic without providing any 
guarantees that any particular packet will actually arrive at its destination.  If the network 
becomes congested, some packets will be dropped and will have to be resent.  Second, TCP/IP 
routes traffic on a “first come, first served” basis without giving priority to content associated 
with any particular application. 
 This approach to routing worked well for traditional early Internet applications, such as 
traditional e-mail and web browsing.  Both primarily conveyed text and as a result were not 
particularly bandwidth intensive.  In addition, for these applications delays of a fraction of a 
                                                 
17 For a more technical discussion of the ideas that follow, see Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 8, 
at 8, 20-23. 
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second were almost imperceptible, and consumers were not adversely affected if any particular 
packet was dropped and had to be resent. 
 Many contemporary Internet applications, such as streaming video, telemedicine, and 
online video games, are less tolerant of delay.18  The problem is that TCP/IP cannot guarantee 
the quality of service that these applications need to survive.  Although network neutrality 
proponents have suggested that the better solution would be for network providers to build more 
bandwidth,19 the bandwidth limitations of some modes of transmission (such as wireless) are so 
severe that deploying more bandwidth is not a realistic solution under any time frame.  Even 
when adding bandwidth is feasible, maintaining sufficient capacity is quite a challenge when 
conservative estimates project that network demand is growing at 50% each year and might 
double in the near future.  The unpredictability of geographic shifts in population further 
complicates bandwidth planning, as do the unexpected surges in demand caused by the 
emergence of new services like YouTube.  Bandwidth, moreover, cannot be expanded 
instantaneously.  Unless network providers are expected to be perfectly prescient, situations will 
exist in which expanding bandwidth is simply not available as an option.  In those circumstances, 
a simple solution would be to prioritize traffic associated with applications that are less tolerant 
of delay over traffic associated with applications that are more tolerant of delay.20 
                                                 
18 Another oft-cited example is Internet telephony, also known as voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP).  
Indeed, telephony is one of the examples that the scientists who laid out the Internet’s original architecture said 
would be an exception to the system of end-to-end rechecking that characterized TCP/IP.  See J.H. Saltzer et al., 
End-to-End Arguments in System Design, 2 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER SYS. 277, 285 (1984).  Somewhat 
ironically, modern VoIP services do not even use TCP/IP, opting instead for a protocol known as UDP.  Moreover, 
even though voice is relatively sensitive to delay, its bandwidth requirements are so low that it can be carried 
effectively through the bandwidth that exists today.  See Edward W. Felten, Nuts and Bolts of Network Neutrality 9 
(July 6, 2006), available at http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/pub/neutrality.pdf). 
19 See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 12, at 47; Net Neutrality: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation, 109th Cong. 3-4 (2006) (statement of Gary R. Bachula, Vice President, Internet2), 
available at http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/bachula-020706.pdf. 
20 See Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 8, at 22-23, 70-71; Yoo, Consumers, and Innovation, 
supra note 8, at 187-90, 228-32. 
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 Network providers confronted with these constraints have no choice but to turn to some 
form of network management.  Consider AT&T’s uVerse offering.  Rather than undertaking the 
expense of rewiring its entire service area for fiber, AT&T is attempting to deploy a triple play of 
voice, data, and multichannel video through a VDSL platform traveling over the existing 
network of telephone wires.  To do so, AT&T must deploy a wide variety of techniques to 
conserve bandwidth.  For example, instead of following cable television’s practice of 
transmitting all of the available channels regardless of whether the subscriber is watching them, 
AT&T employs a switched digital video technology that only transmits those channels that 
customers are actually viewing.  In addition, AT&T violates network neutrality by prioritizing its 
own IP video traffic over other traffic, a practice that was explicitly condoned by the network 
neutrality commitment included in the order approving AT&T’s acquisition of BellSouth.21 
 A similar problem is faced by mobile wireless broadband providers.  Many of them 
throttle video for the simple reason that unless they do so, the decision by a small number of end 
users to download video would render the service unusable for every other customer.  Other 
mobile wireless providers are experimenting with a wide range of alternative solutions.  Some 
are employing increasingly intelligent networks that can detect whether a particular mobile 
device is located in a high bandwidth or low bandwidth area.  When in a low bandwidth location, 
the network holds back traffic associated with applications like e-mail that are not particularly 
sensitive to delay and gives priority to traffic associated with applications like voice that are very 
sensitive to delay.  Many of these solutions are quite innovative.  The problem is that they 
require a greater degree of prioritization and integration between networks, applications, and 
devices than permitted by most forms of network neutrality.  Barring prioritization and 
                                                 
21 AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corp. Application for Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 22 
F.C.C.R. 5662, 5814 (2007). 
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restricting intelligence to the edges of the network would foreclose these solutions from being 
implemented, which in turn would place a burden that would fall particularly disproportionately 
hard on those applications that are sensitive to latency.   
 TCP/IP’s inability to support the new demands that end users are placing on the network 
has led many of the leading figures in the establishment of the Internet to suggest that the 
existing network architecture may be becoming obsolete.22  It also explains why the National 
Science Foundation has begun a project known as the Global Environment for Network 
Innovations dedicated to providing a new platform to avoid the limitations built into the 
Internet’s current design that inhibit emerging applications and technologies.23 
 These examples illustrate that government mandated adherence to the Internet’s current 
design would be anything but neutral.  Contrary to the claims of network neutrality proponents, 
the Internet’s current architecture only fosters competition among a particular subset of Internet 
content and applications, i.e., those content and applications optimized for the network as it 
exists today.  It effectively discriminates against innovations that depend on a different network 
design.   
 This in turn suggests that allowing network providers to experiment with architectures 
that prioritize particular applications and permit a closer integration of network, applications, and 
devices would foster a different and perhaps deeper kind of innovation.  If so, mandating that the 
Internet remain seamlessly interoperable with the intelligence residing solely at the edges of the 
                                                 
22 See Andrew Orlowski, Father of Internet Warns Against Net Neutrality, THE REGISTER, Jan. 18, 2007, 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/01/18/kahn_net_neutrality_warning/ (quoting TCP/IP co-author Robert Kahn); 
David Talbot, The Internet Is Broken, MIT TECH. REV., Dec. 2005/Jan. 2006, at 63, available at 
http://www.technologyreview.com/article/16356/ (quoting Internet elder statesman and onetime chief protocol 
architect David D. Clark); Carol Wilson, Point of No Return, TELEPHONY, Apr. 3, 2006, available at http://voip-
blog.tmcnet.com/blog/rich-tehrani/voip/point-of-no-return.html (quoting former FCC Chief Technologist and so-
called “grandfather of the Internet” David Farber). 
23 GENI: Global Environment for Network Innovations, Conceptual Design Project Execution Plan, GDD-06-
07, at 7 (Jan. 10, 2006), available at http://www.geni.net/GDD/GDD-06-07.pdf. 
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network might have the perverse effect of inhibiting the very innovation that network neutrality 
proponents seek to promote.  The possibility that innovation might well be better promoted by 
allowing greater integration between the network and the applications and devices running on it 
is thus an important consideration that should be taken into account in any case-by-case approach 
to network neutrality. 
Network Neutrality and Consumers 
 Network neutrality proponents often frame their arguments in terms of consumers as well 
as innovation.  One argument is that network neutrality would maximize consumer choice by 
allowing end users to assert complete control over the content and applications they access.  For 
the reasons laid out above, it would only maximize choice among a constrained set of options, 
i.e., content and application optimized for the existing set of protocols.  At the same time, it 
would limit consumer choice by forestalling the emergence of innovations based on architectures 
that allow a tighter integration of the network and applications.  This loss is often hard to discern, 
as it is difficult to determine the value of an opportunity that never appeared.  But the loss to 
consumers is quite real nonetheless. 
 I would like to focus the rest of this section on the two other claims about how network 
neutrality would affect consumers.  The first is that allowing network providers to offer 
prioritized service would create a two-tiered Internet in which only the rich would get the fast 
lane, while those unable or unwilling to pay would be consigned to the slow lane.24  The second 
                                                 
24 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig & Robert W. McChesney, No Tolls on the Internet, WASH. POST, June 8, 2006, 
at A23; 152 CONG. REC. S8367-68 (daily ed. July 27, 2006) (statement of Sen. Ron Wyden). 
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is that allowing network providers to charge content and application providers more for premium 
services would force consumers to pay twice.25 
 Closer analysis reveals that these claims are more complicated and controversial than 
network neutrality proponents suggest.  In many cases, permitting network providers to offer 
multiple classes of services may actually lower the prices that consumers pay.  Any attempt to 
mandate network neutrality must take into account the possibility that doing so may end up 
harming as well as benefiting consumers. 
 The Potential Consumer Benefits from Tiered Services 
 The error in the claim that only deep pocketed consumers and corporations would be able 
to gain access to the fast lane is well illustrated through an analogy to postal services.26  It is 
simply false that only the rich and the well heeled use overnight mail and that small companies 
and consumers of moderate means are consigned to using first class mail.  Instead, customers 
choose their service based on how much they need a given level of service.  Customers who do 
not mind if a particular letter takes as many as three days to travel from coast to coast will 
continue to use first class mail regardless of their ability to pay.  Conversely, companies with 
business models that depend on overnight delivery recognize that overnight service requires 
greater costs.  They willingly and gladly pay more for faster services for the simple reason that 
without premium prices, the overnight services on which their business models depend would 
not exist.  This is true whether the firm is a Fortune 500 with enormous reserves or a startup that 
is working hard to conserve its cash.  Similarly, consumers who absolutely, positively need a 
                                                 
25 See, e.g., Net Neutrality: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 109th 
Cong. 6 (2006) (statement of Vinton G. Cerf, Vice President and Chief Internet Evangelist, Google, Inc.), available 
at http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/cerf-020706.pdf [hereinafter Cerf testimony]. 
26 See Yoo, Consumers, and Innovation, supra note 8, at 232-33. 
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letter delivered overnight are similarly grateful for the existence of carriers able to provide those 
services.  Although they would no doubt wish to pay the lowest price possible, they recognize 
that the price for an overnight letter will inevitably exceed the 42 cents needed for a first class 
stamp.   
 Consider further what would happen if the postal authorities forbade carriers from 
differentiating between overnight mail and regular first class mail and instead required them to 
offer a single class of service.  The postal service would face three choices.  It could require that 
all mail travel as first class mail, in which case all letters would take three days to travel coast to 
coast and cost 42 cents.  Unifying service in this manner would frustrate the interests of 
businesses and consumers who need overnight delivery but can no longer obtain it no matter how 
much they might be willing to pay for it.  Alternatively, the postal service could require that all 
mail travel as express mail, in which case all letters would travel coast to coast overnight and 
would cost over $15.  This would force all mailers to pay higher prices even though many of 
them would not need speedy delivery.  Lastly, the postal service could split the difference, such 
as by delivering coast-to-coast mail in two days for a cost of approximately $5 in a manner 
similar to priority mail.  Although this service would be well suited to some customers, it would 
simultaneously increase the prices of those who were perfectly happy with the level of service 
provided by first class mail and deny service to those who need overnight delivery.  The more 
straightforward solution is to allow the postal service to offer multiple classes of service.  That 
way, each customer can obtain the services they need while only paying for the levels of service 
that they actually need. 
 How does this play out in the context of the Internet?  The fact that traffic is growing at a 
rate of 50% a year or more means that network providers must invest heavily to increase the 
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bandwidth capacity of their networks.  Verizon has committed to investing $24 billion to deploy 
its fiber-based FiOS network.  Other providers have chosen less costly solutions, such as 
AT&T’s deployment of its VDSL uVerse network and the cable industry’s upgrade to DOCSIS 
3.0.  But even in those cases, the capital expenditures are significant. 
 In an ideal consumer world, network providers would provide these bandwidth 
enhancements without raising prices.  The reality is that network providers must have some 
reasonable prospect of recovering these capital expenditures if they are expected to undertake 
them.  Thus, absent the unlikely event of direct government subsidies, a network provider that 
was unable to offer different classes of service would have to raise the prices for all consumers to 
the price needed to support the higher level of service.  This would have the unfortunate effect of 
raising prices for end users who only use the Internet for low bandwidth applications like e-mail 
and are perfectly happy with the service they were receiving before.  Moreover, unless some 
form of metered pricing is imposed, the price would be set equal to the usage levels of the 
average consumer.  This would overcharge below-average users while simultaneously 
undercharging above-average uses, in effect forcing low-bandwidth users to cross subsidize 
high-bandwidth users.27   
 Moreover, a network provider that is only allowed to offer a single class of service will 
choose the bandwidth level that appeals to the largest number of customers possible.  Limiting 
network providers to offering a single class of service thus makes it unlikely that those 
consumers who do want the highest level of bandwidth possible will be able to get it.  The 
situation is quite different if you allow differential pricing.  Rather than raise prices on everyone, 
network providers have the ability to charge higher prices to those who need the enhanced 
                                                 
27 See Yoo, supra note 2, at 1853-54. 
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services without raising the prices for those who were happy with the prior levels of service.  
Such a solution would accord with economic efficiency and general ideas of fairness, in that it 
would require those who need and benefit from the improved service to pay for those 
improvements without placing additional burdens on those who do not benefit from the service 
enhancement. 
 On a broader level, these insights about the benefits of differential pricing for enhanced 
services provides another example of how the Internet is evolving away from one-size-fits-all 
solutions.  By focusing exclusively on the consumer benefits from nondiscrimination among the 
content and applications that exist today, network neutrality proponents overlook the benefits 
arising from the ability to tailor pricing and services to individual consumers’ needs. 
 The Economics of Two-Sided Markets 
 At a somewhat more technical level, economic theory not only justifies allowing network 
owners to charge differential prices to consumers.  The economics of two-sided markets also 
identifies potential consumer benefits from allowing network operators to impose differential 
prices on content and application providers as well.28 
 The economics of two-sided markets are somewhat complex.  Conventional economics 
has long recognized the existence of “network economic effects,” which cause a network to 
increase in value as the number of users connected to it increases.  To use a classic example, the 
value of a telephone network to consumers is thus determined by more than just the price 
charged and the services provided, as is the case with most goods.  It also depends on the number 
                                                 
28 For a more extended discussion of the implications of the economics of two-sided markets for network 
neutrality, see Yoo, Consumers and Innovation, supra note 8, at 222-27. 
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of other subscribers connected to the network.  The more people you can reach through the 
network, the more valuable it becomes. 
 The telephone system is an example of a one-sided market, in that the value to any 
particular caller is determined in no small part by the number of similarly situated callers.  When 
a market is two sided, instead of bringing together a single class of similarly situated users, 
networks bring together two completely different classes of users.  In those cases, the value is 
determined not by the number of users of the same class, but rather the number of users of the 
other class.  To put it in terms of a concrete example, consider the economics of broadcast 
television, which generates revenue from advertisers based on the number viewers the industry 
can deliver.  The value of the network for advertisers is not determined by the number of other 
advertisers.  Instead, the value of the network increases with the number of a different class of 
network participants (i.e., television viewers). 
 The economics of two-sided markets indicate that it may be socially beneficial for 
content and application providers to subsidize the prices paid by end users.  The fact that the 
Internet has become increasingly dominated by advertising revenue paid to content and 
application providers rather than network providers makes this particularly likely to be true.  An 
advertiser’s willingness to pay for an ad on any particular website depends on the number of end 
users viewing that website.  Under these circumstances, the optimal solution may be for the 
website owner to subsidize the total number of end users by making payments to the network 
provider to help defray their costs of connection.  The costs of subsidizing more users would be 
more than offset by the additional revenue generated by the fact that advertisers can now reach 
more potential customers.29 
                                                 
29 See id. at 225-26. 
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 These revenue-side pressures are reinforced by cost-side considerations.  The cost of 
connecting content and application providers to the Internet is quite low, typically only requiring 
a single high-speed line to a small number of business locations.  The cost of connecting end 
users to the Internet is much higher, requiring the wiring and upgrading of equipment in entire 
neighborhoods.  In an industry in which the primary revenue is flowing to content and 
application providers and the costs involved in connecting content and application providers are 
much smaller than the costs of connecting end users, one would expect some cash to flow from 
content and application providers to those who are providing connections to end users.30   
 These dynamics are again well illustrated by broadcast television.  In many ways, 
broadcast television and the Internet are analogous.  The movie studios that create television 
programs play a similar role to content and application providers.  Television networks aggregate 
programs and deliver them nationally in much the same manner as server-side network providers 
and backbone providers.  Local broadcast stations provide last-mile connectivity that is quite 
similar to the role played by DSL and cable modem providers.  In addition, the revenue structure 
is quite comparable, in that television networks receive advertising revenue in much the same 
manner as content and application providers.  Furthermore, the cost structure is somewhat 
similar in that connecting individual homes is much more costly than distributing programming 
nationally. 
 For decades, the standard business arrangement has been for television networks to 
subsidize the operations of local broadcast stations by paying them to be members of their 
                                                 
30 See P. Faratin et al., Complexity of Internet Interconnections: Technology Incentives and Implications for 
Policy 13 (Sept. 30, 2007) (paper presented at the 35th Annual Telecommunications Policy Research Conference), 
available at 
http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2007/797/Clark%20Lehr%20Faratin%20Complexity%20Interconnection%20TP
RC%202007.pdf. 
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television networks.  The industry’s revenue and cost structure make such arrangements quite 
logical.  The cost of paying these broadcast stations to affiliate with a network is more than offset 
by the increase in advertising revenue made possible by the fact that the network is now able to 
reach a larger audience.  Broadcast television thus represents a prime example of when firms 
operating on one side of the market find it economically beneficial to subsidize end users on the 
other side of the market. 
 Furthermore, the magnitude of the affiliation fees that the networks pay to broadcast 
stations is anything but uniform.  The precise amount paid varies with the relative strength of the 
network and the relative strength of the broadcast station.  Stronger broadcast stations receive 
more, while weaker ones receive less.  Equally interesting is the fact that in recent years, the cash 
flow has begun to vary in its direction as well as magnitude, with weaker stations having to pay 
rather than be paid to be part of the television network.  The dynamic nature of this pricing 
regime benefits consumers by providing incentives for networks to invest in better quality 
programming and by providing an incentive for stations to provide better carriage.   
 Pricing flexibility is the standard mechanism by which our society rewards socially 
beneficial behavior and reallocates resources.  This process of equilibration works well so long 
as entry barriers are relatively low and inputs are relatively mobile.  These conditions are easily 
met with respect to content and applications, which are already very competitive and unprotected 
by entry barriers (and therefore likely to remain that way).  The upsurge of mobile wireless as a 
last-mile platform has made these conditions easier to satisfy on the network provider side as 
well.  The impending emergence of new broadband platforms made possible by the 700 MHz 
auction and other technologies promises to open the last-mile to competition still further in the 
future. 
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 The two-sided market analysis reveals the problems with the claim that allowing network 
providers to charge content and application providers for premium services would force 
consumers to pay twice.  As a general matter, pricing flexibility makes it easier for network 
providers to recover the costs of building additional bandwidth.  Left to their own devices, 
network providers would set prices designed to maximize the revenue generated by each side of 
the market.  So long as competitive entry is sufficiently feasible to prevent network providers 
from simply pocketing the extra returns, facilitating network providers’ ability to generate 
revenue from one side of the market will reduce the proportion of the fixed costs that the 
network provider will have to recover from the other side of the market.  Thus granting network 
providers pricing flexibility with respect to content and application providers should reduce the 
economic burden borne by end users. 
 Conversely, preventing network providers from exercising pricing flexibility with respect 
to content and application providers while permitting them to exercise pricing flexibility against 
end users simply increases the proportion of the cost network providers must recover directly 
from end users.  This simultaneously raises the prices paid by consumers and decreases the 
likelihood that the capital improvements will ever be built.31  Conversely, enhancing pricing 
flexibility on both sides of the market increases the likelihood that network providers will 
recover a greater proportion of the costs of upgrading the network from content and application 
providers.  Charging content and application providers premium prices for premium services is 
thus a way to reduce, not increase, the burden borne by consumers. 
                                                 
31 See Wall Street’s Perspective on Telecommunications:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation, 109th Cong. 3-4 (2006) (testimony of Craig E. Moffett, Vice President and Senior 
Analyst, Sanford C. Bernstein & Co.), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/moffett-031406.pdf. 
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 This is not to say that allowing network providers to offer multiple classes of services 
would always be economically beneficial.  If perfect price discrimination were feasible, 
differential pricing schemes would invariably benefit society.  Perfect price discrimination is 
impossible, however, and to the extent that price discrimination is imperfect, the practice might 
reduce as well as increase economic welfare.  That said, economic textbooks generally conclude 
that imperfect price discrimination is more likely to be beneficial than not.32  In any event, the 
real possibility that price discrimination may benefit and not just harm consumers counsels 
strongly against erecting a categorical ban against the practice and provides an important 
consideration that a well designed case-by-case approach should take into account. 
Network Neutrality and Last-Mile Competition 
 Perhaps the most important consideration that should be incorporated into a case-by-case 
analysis is the impact that any network neutrality mandate would have on competition in the last 
mile.  It is often overlooked that mandating access to the existing network represents only one of 
two ways to promote competition in content and applications.  The other is to promote entry by 
new last-mile providers.33  Once a sufficient number of last-mile providers exists, any content or 
application provider unable to obtain access from one last-mile provider will simply turn to one 
of its competitors.  Indeed, most network neutrality proponents agree the emergence of 
competition in the last-mile would render network neutrality regulation unnecessary.34 
 There are a number of important considerations that should inform the choice between 
these two approaches.  As an initial matter, experience has shown that mandated access regimes 
                                                 
32 See RICHARD G. LIPSEY ET AL., ECONOMICS 241 (8th ed. 1987); F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL 
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 495 (3d ed. 1990). 
33 See Yoo, Comment on End-to-End, supra note 8, at 67-68. 
34 See, e.g., Cerf testimony, supra note 25, at 7. 
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are extremely difficult to implement.35  For example, if the network provider offers its own 
content and applications, a simple nondiscrimination mandate will simply lead the network 
provider to charge a nondiscriminatory price that is so exorbitant that independent providers of 
content and applications will not be able to pay it.  The fact that the vertically integrated content 
and applications will also have to pay the higher price is of little consequence, because any 
losses suffered by the content and application division will be offset by gains enjoyed by the 
networking division.  Thus, absent rate regulation, the network provider can continue to exclude 
unaffiliated content and applications simply by transferring profits from one division to another.  
In addition, without rate regulation, access rules simply require the network owner to share its 
monopoly while continuing to allow it to charge the monopoly price.  The lack of any price 
decrease means that consumers do not benefit at all.36 
 Any access regime must thus necessarily be accompanied by rate regulation.  As I have 
argued at greater length elsewhere, rate regulation is particularly likely to fail when the 
commodity being regulated varies in quality.  For example, research has shown that cable 
operators were able to defeat regulation by degrading the quality of their programming.  Thus, 
regulators seeking to impose rate regulation over such providers must undertake the difficult job 
or regulating quality as well as price.  Furthermore, the implementation of rate regulation is 
particularly ineffective in industries undergoing rapid technological change.37   
 The fact that compelled access forces two unwilling business partners to do business with 
one another means that the network provider will do no more than the minimum necessary to 
                                                 
35 See Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 8, at 37-48; Yoo, supra note 2, at 1896-97; Yoo, supra 
note 14, at 244-46, 268-69. 
36 See Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 8, at 15; Yoo, Comment on End-to-End, supra note 8, at 
56. 
37 See Christopher S. Yoo, Architectural Censorship and the FCC , 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 669, 685-87 (2005); 
Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 8, at 42-43. 
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comply with its legal obligations.  The parties can be expected to argue over a wide range of 
nonprice issues.  As the Supreme Court has recognized, such negotiations are likely to be 
extremely protracted and difficult to police when the interface is complex and multifaceted, as 
the network owner will have an almost limitless number of ways to degrade service at its 
disposal.38  Thus in order to succeed, access requires nearly comprehensive regulation of the 
business relationship between the two parties.  It is for these reasons that the FCC’s experience 
policing access regimes has not been a happy one.  The agency’s attempts to implement such 
varied regimes as leased access, video dialtone, and open video services have largely failed.  
Equally troubling is the difficulties the agency has encountered implementing the access 
provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which has engendered a decade of litigation 
and few real benefits.39 
 Perhaps most troubling is that the mandatory access approach contains no exit plan.  
When competitive entry is possible, short-run supracompetitive returns are not only 
unproblematic, they are essential to the proper functioning of the economic system.  It is the 
desire to share in these supracompetitive returns that stimulates others to reallocate resources and 
sell a competing product.  This entry will occur until all supracompetitive returns are dissipated.  
The imposition of rate regulation as part of access regulation short circuits this mechanism, 
because limiting the network provider’s ability to earn supracompetitive returns reduces the 
incentive for others to enter the market.  This dynamic is again nicely illustrated by the broadcast 
television industry.  The longstanding triopoly of television networks led the FCC to impose a 
wide variety of measures to limit broadcast networks’ profitability.  Because these rules limited 
the profitability of new networks as well as incumbents, they actually became an entry barrier, as 
                                                 
38 See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 411, 414 (2004). 
39 See Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 8, at 39-42; Yoo, supra note 14, at 244-46, 268-69. 
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demonstrated by the fact that the Fox network needed to be exempted from these rules before it 
became viable.40  Access regulation is thus best understood as surrender to the putative 
monopoly and presumes that regulation will be indefinite.41  Such an approach might be 
defensible if entry by competitors is impossible.  As noted above, that precondition becomes less 
true with every passing year. 
 Consider the alternative, which is promoting innovation and consumer benefits by 
promoting competition in the last mile.  Even network neutrality proponents concede that the 
need for regulation disappears once sufficient last-mile competition has emerged.  As it turns out, 
there is a deep connection between the prioritization of applications and promoting last-mile 
competition.  The connection is illustrated by the problems faced by companies using white 
spaces in the spectrum to provide wireless broadband in rural areas.  Given the limited amount of 
bandwidth they are permitted to use, these companies must prioritize time sensitive applications 
(such as voice) over less time sensitive applications (such as file downloading) if they are to 
provide adequate service.  In addition, they completely bar certain high-bandwidth applications 
altogether, as a single user employing them would prevent any other user from obtaining service.  
Such prioritization is an integral part of their survival as a last-mile competitor. 
 Another example is AT&T’s uVerse network, which uses the limited bandwidth 
previously deployed for voice communications to offer video as well.  Because video is one of 
those applications that are very sensitive to delay, the only way AT&T can offer an acceptable 
video service is by giving video traffic priority over other traffic.  The resulting competition with 
cable for multichannel video helps satisfy one of our nation’s longest standing goals in 
communications policy.  Certain technologies simply cannot provide the guaranteed quality of 
                                                 
40 See Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 8, at 49 n.188. 
41 See id. at 11, 51, 76; Yoo, Comment on End-to-End, supra note 8, at 56. 
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service needed to support high bandwidth applications like video unless video traffic is given 
priority. 
 As noted earlier, mobile broadband providers are similarly experimenting with different 
solutions to solve the strict bandwidth limitations that they face.  Many throttle video for the 
simple reason that if they did not do so, video downloading would render the service unusable by 
other customers.  Others prioritize traffic associated with latency-sensitive applications over 
other traffic.  Others are transferring functions in to the computing power contained in handheld 
devices.  Still others are transferring functions into the network itself. 
 I have shown elsewhere how allowing network providers greater flexibility in managing 
congestion on the Internet can provide real benefits to consumers.42  Indeed, it is possible to 
analyze the engineering tradeoff between building additional bandwidth and permitting network 
providers to prioritize traffic.  If network providers are not allowed to use prioritization to 
guarantee throughput rates, they must maintain additional bandwidth to ensure that sufficient 
excess capacity exists to carry that traffic without delay.  A recent study estimated that a network 
without prioritization might have to maintain up to 60% more capacity than a network offering 
prioritized service.43  The need to maintain excess capacity will deter the buildout of broadband 
networks by raising the density of customers needed for the service to break even.  The failure to 
prioritize thus threatens to worsen the digital divide by making it more difficult to serve rural 
areas. 
 These examples underscore the incredible variation in technical challenges confronting 
different transmission technologies and how innovative the industry has been in meeting those 
                                                 
42 See Yoo, supra note 2, at 1863-85. 
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http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2007/786/Evolving%20Internet.pdf. 
 27
challenges.  Without the ability to prioritize traffic on the basis of the underlying application, 
many of these providers could not survive as last-mile competitors.  It is difficult to predict 
which, if any, of these strategies will prove successful.  Indeed, it is quite likely that different 
portions of the industry may adopt different solutions dictated by their underlying technology. 
 Any case-by-case approach must be careful to take these considerations into account and 
to leave network providers with enough flexibility to experiment with different strategies.  Too 
strict an approach would forestall innovative solutions to address bandwidth limitations. 
Recommendations and Conclusions 
 To date, the debate over network neutrality has been framed in largely categorical terms, 
with both sides trying to claim the virtues of freedom, innovation, consumer welfare, and 
competition.  A closer analysis of the issue reveals that it is more complex and variegated than 
the terms of the existing debate suggest.  The economic literature does acknowledge the 
existence of circumstances under which deviations from network neutrality might give rise to 
anticompetitive harms.  At the same time, the literature shows that those harms can only arise 
under limited circumstances and that deviations from network neutrality may actually create 
substantial benefits. 
 The ambiguity of network neutrality’s policy implications underscores the propriety of 
adopting a case-by-case approach.  As the Supreme Court has long recognized, ex ante, 
categorical rules are blunt instruments that do not permit fine distinctions.  This is why the 
Supreme Court has reserved them for things that are so clearly detrimental that little would be 
lost if the practice were to be banned altogether.  And even then, the Supreme Court has long 
recognized that such ex ante approaches should not be applied when a practice is so new that the 
Court does not have sufficient experience to predict the likely economic impact of prohibiting it.  
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When a practice is either new or when its economic impact is unclear, as seems to be the case 
with deviations from network neutrality, the better approach is to take an ex post, case-by-case 
approach.44 
 The bigger question is how that case-by-case approach should be applied.  The foregoing 
analysis identifies numerous considerations that policymakers should take into account.  In most 
cases, these considerations require a close examination of the facts of each particular case.  
Eventually, enough precedents will exist to permit those planning in the shadow of network 
neutrality rules to discern the principles being applied.  The problem is that considerable 
uncertainty will exist until a sufficient critical mass of decisions is reached,  
 The FCC would thus be well advised to offer more details about the approach it will 
apply in future cases.  The most logical approach would be to use the basic principles animating 
antitrust law to fill in the content of the case-by-case analysis.  Antitrust jurisprudence represents 
perhaps the most systematic and comprehensive body of law designed to evaluate practices to 
make sure that they promote the interests of consumers and innovation.  Equally importantly, by 
placing the burden of proof on the party challenging a particular practice, antitrust law is 
designed to ensure every economic actor has enough breathing room to experiment with different 
approaches.  Although it is tempting to place the burden of proof on those who wish to deviate 
from the status quo, there are risks in adhering to, as well as deviating from, the status quo.  That 
is why leading theorists have concluded that prophylactic regulation in favor of the status quo is 
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justified only when the potential adverse consequences are truly catastrophic and irreversible.45  
Any other rule would prevent society from finding which, if any, alternative states of the world 
might be socially beneficial.46 
 In addition, antitrust law teaches that any case-by-case approach must also be careful to 
protect consumers, not competitors.  Every change inevitably creates winners and losers, and 
deviations from the status quo are often opposed by the players dominating the current market, as 
they are the ones with the most invested in the network as it exists today and thus are the ones 
with the most to lose.  The success that the Internet has enjoyed under its current architecture 
should not blind policymakers to the fact that the world is constantly changing.  They should 
instead take care to remain open to the possibility that abandoning the one-size-fits-all solution 
that has long characterized the Internet may be the best way to promote invitation and to benefit 
consumers. 
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